Prof. Sir James A. Mirrlees
received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1996 for
his fundamental contributions to the economic theory
of incentives under asymmetric information. His
research centered on situations in which economic
information is asymmetrical or incomplete,
determining the extent to which they should affect
the optimal rate of saving in an economy. Among
other results, his work demonstrated the principals
of “moral hazard” and “optimal income taxation”, a
methodology that has since become the standard in
the field.
Born in Scotland in 1936, James Mirrlees obtained
his first and second degrees in Mathematics from the
University of Edinburgh and the University of
Cambridge and his PhD in Economics from Cambridge in
1963. He was Edgeworth Professor of Economics and
Fellow of Nuffield College in Oxford from 1968 to
1995 and after 1995 Professor of Political Economy
at Cambridge. Since 2002 he has been Distinguished
Professor-at-Large at The Chinese University of Hong
Kong, and in 2009 he became Master of Morningside
College, established in The Chinese University of
Hong Kong.
Sir James has also held Visiting Professorships at
MIT, UC Berkeley, Yale, the University of Melbourne
and Peking University. He was President of the Royal
Economic Society from 1989 to 1992 and is a fellow
of the British Academy, the Royal Society of
Edinburgh and the Econometric Society and a Foreign
Honorary Member of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences and the American Economic Association. He
was knighted for contributions to economic science
in 1997 and received the Royal Medal of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh in 2009.
Professor Sir James Mirrlees’ areas of work include
development economics, taxation theory, economic
growth, principal/agent problems and welfare
economics. In the work that earned him the Nobel
Prize Sir James studied the problem of optimal
income taxation in a situation where individuals
take the tax schedule into account when choosing
their work effort and the government does not have
information on the productivity of individual
citizens. In such a case a high tax rate will
discourage people from working hard while a low tax
rate will result in government budget deficits. The
theory shows how to derive an optimal tax schedule,
balancing efficiency and equity and taking into
account the limited information about individuals
that is available to the government.
Many economists want to use the tax system to
achieve a higher degree in equality which means
taking a substantial amount of the additional income
of high-income people, implying high marginal tax
rates on them. But when the government imposes such
high marginal tax rates on the highest-income
people, it reduces the incentive of the most
productive people to be productive. There is, in
short, a trade-off between equality and efficiency.
Economists have long wanted to figure out the
optimum, but until Professor Sir James’ work no one
had been able to solve it.
Also, working with American economist Peter Diamond
on consumption taxes, Professor Sir James Mirrlees
found that small economies should not impose tariffs
on foreign trade and that taxation should be on
consumption, not production.
Another significant contribution of Sir James’ work
deals with the problem of moral hazard. For example,
full insurance coverage encourages individuals not
to take precautions against risk and as a result
lowers the insurance company profits. The theory
shows how to construct contracts that provide
correct incentives for behavior that cannot be
observed. This work also allows companies to design
contract terms that give their employees incentives
to act as much as possible in accordance with the
companies' objective of profit maximization. Sir
James' work laid the foundation for the modern
analysis of complex information and incentive
problems which can be applied to many other similar
situations.
Being a member of Scotland’s Council of Economic
Advisors, Professor Sir James Mirrlees led the
Mirrlees Review of Taxation, a review of the UK tax
system by the Institute for Fiscal Studies. A
selection of his papers has been published by Oxford
University Press as Welfare Incentives and Taxation,
and his students have included eminent academics and
policy makers such as Sir Partha Dasgupta, Professor
Huw Dixon, Lord Nicholas Stern, Professor Anthony
Venables and Sir John Vickers.